UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

5-27-2009

Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co. Appellant's
Brief Dckt. 35949

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co. Appellant's Brief Dckt. 35949" (2009). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 188.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/188

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
VERNON JERRY MORTENSEN,

)
)
PlaintiffIAppellant,
)
)
v.
)
)
STEWART
TITLE
GUARANTY )

COMPANY,
DefendantIRespondent.

Supreme Court No. 35949-2008
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

1
1
1
)
)
)
)

1
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
KOOTENAI
HONORABLE LANSING L. HAYNES, PRESIDING DISTRICT JUDGE
Sam Johnson, ISB No. 4777
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P.
405 South Eighth Street, Suite 250
Boise, ID 83702

ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

Todd Reuter, ISB No. 5573
KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART
PRESTON GATES ELLIS, L.L.P.
618 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 300
Spokane, WA 99201-0602
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT

-

I.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

11.

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

111.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

IV.

V.

A.

Nature of the Case

B.

Course of Proceedings Below

C.

Statement of Facts

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Did the district court err by granting summary judgment on
Mortensen's claim for breach of the title insurance contract?

B.

Did the district court err when applying the doctrine of QuasiEstoppel to the facts presented in this case?

C.

Did the district court e n in ruling the Mortensen's claim for
emotional distress was barred by the statute of limitations
contained in Idaho Code 5 5-219?

D.

Did the district court err when ruling on Mortensen's motion for
Reconsideration that Mortensen "did not plead a breach of
Contract for failure of Defendant to perform diligently"?

E.

Did the district court err in awarding Stewart Title the sum of
$25,000.00 in attorney fees under Idaho Code $41-1839(4)?

F.

Whether Mortensen is entitled to an award of attorney fees
on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code fi 41-1839(4) andlor Idaho
Code 12-120(3).

ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review on Appeal

B.

The District Court Erred by Granting Summary Judgment
on Mortensen's Claim for Breach of the Title Insurance Contract

C.

The District Court Erred in its Application of the Doctrine of
Quasi-Estoppel to the Facts Presented Here.

D.

The District Court Erred In Ruling the Claim for Emotional
i

Distress was Time Barred by the Statute of Limitations Contained
In Idaho Code 5 5-219.
E.

The District Court Erred when Ruling Mortensen did not Plead
a Breach of Contract for Failure of Stewart Title to Perform
Diligently.

16

F.

The District Court Erred by Awarding Attorney Fees to Stewart
Title.

16

G.

Attorney Fees on Appeal

CONCLUSION
11.

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Sorensen v. St. Alphonsus Rep? Med Ctr.. Inc.
141 Idaho 754,758 (2005)
Harris v. State, Dept, ofHealth & Welfare
123 Idaho 295,298,847 P.2d 1156 1159 (1992)
Ashley v. Hubbard
100 Idaho 67,69,593 P.2d 402,404 (1979)
Doe v. Durtschi
Idaho 466,470 (Idaho 1986) 716 P.2d 1238,1242
Bonz v. Sudweeks
119 Idaho 539,541,808 P.2d 876,878 (1991)
McCoy v. Lyons
120 Idaho 765,769,820 P.2d 360,364 (1991)
State v. Rubbermaid Inc.
129 Idaho 353,356, (Idaho 1996) 924 P.2d 615,618
Thomas v. Cute
78 Idaho 29,3 1,296 P.2d 1033 (1956)
Huphes v. Idaho State Universitv
122 Idaho 435,437,835 P.2d 670 (Ct. App. 1992.)
Luzar v. Western Sur. Co.
107 Idaho 693,696,692 P.2d 337 (1984)

Irwin Roners Ins. Anencv v. Murphy
122 Idaho 270,274,833 P.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1992)
Atwood v. Smith
143 1daho 110,138 P. 3d 310 (2006)
Boise Motor Car Com~anvv. St. Paul Mercurv Indemnih, Cornpanv
62 Idaho 438,448 (1941)
Curtis v. Firth
123 Idaho 598,604,850 P.2d 749,755 (1993)
Quinto v. MiElwood Forest Products
130 Idaho 162,167 (Ct. App. 1997)

AUTHORITIES:
Idaho Code 5 5-219
Idaho Code 5 41-1839(4)

I.A.R. 41, and I.A.R. 35(a)(5)

111.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This case stems from the contractual relationship between a title company,
DefendanURespondent Stewart Title Guaranty Company (hereinafter "Stewart Title") and
its insured, PlaintiffIAppellant Vernon Jerry Mortensen (hereinafter "Mortensen"). This
appeal is brought by Mortensen from the district court's order granting summary
judgment to Stewart Title.
B.

Course of Proceedin~sBelow

Mortensen filed his pro se Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on July 2,2007,
in Kootenai County, Idaho. R., Vol. 1, p. 1. It included the following counts: (1)
Misrepresentation and Fraud; (2) Punitive Damages; (3) Breach of Contract; (4) Bad
Faith; and (5) Emotional Distress. Id Stewart Title filed its Answer to the Complaint on
August 6,2007.
After the pleadings had settled, Stewart Title moved for summary judgment on
January 17, 2008. R., Vol. 1, p. 131. Mortensen opposed the motion by lodging a
written memorandum (R., Vol. 2, p. 332) and the supporting Affidavit of Plaintiff Vernon
Jerry Mortensen (R., Vol. 2, p. 313). The motion was argued and submitted and the
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Stewart Title by way of its

Memorandum Opinion and Order In Re: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
R., Vol. 2, p. 420.
Thereafter, Mortensen filed his motion for reconsideration. R., Vol. 3, p. 505.
The district court denied the motion by issuance of its Memorandum Opinion and Order

In Re: Plaintifs Motion For Reconsideration. R., Vol. 3, p. 586.
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Next, the district court awarded Stewart Title $25,000.00 in attorney fees as the
prevailing party in a suit brought by Mortensen that the district court found unreasonable
and without foundation. See Findings and Conclusions In Re: Costs and Attorney Fees.

R., Vol. 3, p. 603. The district court officially entered summary judgment against
Mortensen on November 19,2008. R., Voi. 3, p. 607.
Mortensen timely filed his Notice of Appeal on November 28, 2008. R., Vol. 3,
p. 627.

C.

Statement of Facts

On or about September 22, 1994, Mortensen purchased a 160 acre parcel of real
property situated in Kootenai County from the Peplinskis. See Mortensen Affidavit, 7 2
at R., Vol. 2, p. 314. In conjunction with the purchase of the 160 acres, Stewart Title
issued a policy of title insurance whereby it agreed to insure Mortensen's right of title
and access to the 160 acres of land. See Movtensen Affidavit,

13 at R., Vol. 2, p.

314.

The access route insured by Stuart Title traversed over property owned by the Akers. At
no time does Mortensen recall Stewart Title delivering a copy of the title policy to him.
Id.
After purchasing the property in 1994, Mortensen regularly and continuously used
the aforementioned access route to travel to and from his property. He had used it for
personal, recreational, commercial, and agricultural pursuits. Over the years, Mortensen
had performed maintenancelrepairs and improvements to the access route.
Mortensen Afidavit,

7 4 at R.,

See

Vol. 2, p. 314.

In 2001, Mortensen sold the northern 80 acres of the 160 acre parcel to David and
Michelle White. Based upon information and belief, Stewart Title issued a policy of title
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insurance to the Whites whereby it agreed to insure the Whites' right of title and access to
the 80 acres of land Mortensen sold to them. See Mortensen Affidavit,

7 5 at R., Vol, 2, p.

314.

Sometime thereafter, Stewart Title recognized the existence of a problem relating to
Mortensen's right of access to his property, and the Whites' right of access to the parcel
Mortensen deeded to them. See Mortensen Affidavit,

7 6 at R.,

Vol. 2, p. 314. Thus, Mr.

John Holt, acting on behalf of Stewart Title, contacted Dennis and Shcrri Akers (the
"Akers") and offered to buy a small parcel of property from them and mentioned that
Stewart Title needed the parcel to provide Mortensen legal access and easement to his
property and the property Mortensen conveyed to the Whites. According to Mr. Holt's
affidavit, he contacted the Akers sometime in late 2001. See Mortensen Affidavit,

17 at

R., Vol. 2, p. 314.
Stewart Title however failed and/or refused to divulge to Mortensen in any way that
it believed there was an accessleasement problem concerning his land, that it had talked
to the Akers in an effort to cure the accessleasement problem or that it tried to purchase
property from Akers to fix the problem.

This information was kept secret from

Mortensen by Stewart Title. See Mortensen Affidavit, 1 8 at R., Vol. 2, p. 315.
Once Stewart Title notified the Akers of the access issue, the Akers filed suit
against Mortensen for trespass, as well as other claims. This lawsuit was filed on January
10, 2002, in the In The District Court Of The First Judicial District Of The State Of
Idaho, In And For The County of Kootenai, Case No. CV-02-222, a true and correct copy
of which is appended to the Affidavit of Todd Reuter In Support Of Stewart Title
Guaranty's Motion For Summary Judgment. See Mortensen Affidavit,
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19 at R., Vol. 2, p.

315. Upon commencement of the Akers suit, Stewart Title first provided the Whites with
a defense and thereafter tendered a defense to Mortensen and answered the Akers'
Complaint on his behalf. See Mortensen Affidavit, 7 10 at R., Vol. 2, p. 315.
Mortensen did not find out about the discussion John Holt of Stewart Title had with
the Akers or Stewart Title's offer to purchase property from the Akers, or Stewart Title's
opinion that the access route across Akers' land was questionable until Mrs. Akers
testified about it in open court during the trial in the above referenced matter. This
testimony occurred on or about September 11,2002. See Mortensen Afjdavit,

7 11 at R.,

Vol. 2, p. 315.
During the pendency of the Akers' lawsuit, a second issue developed over
Mortensen's access to the east end of the access route. In an effort to resolve this
problem, Stewart Title purchased a small, triangular shaped parcel of property from Ms.
Kathryn Baker which was then quitclaimed to the Whites and Mortensen. Stewart Title
recorded the Quitclaim Deed and represented to and assured Mortensen that he owned the
triangular shaped parcel.

Ownership of this triangular shaped parcel however was

disputed by the Akers throughout the Akers litigation. During the lawsuit, based upon
the representations of ownership made by Stewart Title, the Whites and Mortensen began
making improvements to the triangular shaped parcel. See Movtensen Affidavit, 1[ 12 at

R., Vol. 2, p. 316.
Following a court trial in the Akers suit, the district court held that Mortensen did
not have an easement to his property, that he had trespassed by making improvements to
the triangular shaped parcel and that he was liable to the Akers for damages for trespass,
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emotional distress and punitive damages. See Movtensen Affidavit,

fl 13 at R.,

Vol. 2, p.

After the decision rendered by the district court in the Akers lawsuit came down,
Mr. John Holt of Stewart Title represented to and assured Mortensen that it would assist
in appealing the district court's decision. Mr. Holt made these representations over the
phone and in writing. In fact, in his letter dated January 24,2003, Mr. Holt indicated:
As stated in previous correspondence Stewart's obligation
under the Policy is to cure the lack of right of access to or
from the land (see Paragraph 9 of the Conditions and
Stipulations). Stewart is working to cure the access issue in
a diligent manner through the litigation and will continue to
do so via the Reconsideration and/or Appeal Drocess.
(Emphasis added). See Movtensen Affidavit,

7 14 at R., Vol. 2, p. 316.

Thereafter, on

March 17,2004, Mr. Holt confirmed Stewart Title remained committed to the appeal:
Based on the new trial, the post trial briefs and proposed
findings and conclusions ReagadYost both expressed
confidence the Judge would reverse himself and both
recommended that we sit tight and wait for the Judge's
decision. However, in a worse case scenario if the Judge
pemetuates his original findings and conclusions then our
course of action will be to file an appeal.
(Emphasis added). Id.
Stewart Title's attorney, Mr. Richard W. Mollerup, made similar representations
and assurances to Mortensen over the phone and in writing. In fact, in his letter dated
February 19,2003, Mr. Mollerup indicated:
Stewart Title has provided you with a defense for all claims
made [by] Dennis or Sherrie Akers in the lawsuit by
retaining Michal Reagan. That agreement to defend was
subject to a reservation of rights that Stewart Title may not
be liable for damages based on certain allegations in the
lawsuit. Stewart Title intends to continue to provide you
with a defense to all claims in the lawsuit throughout the
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damarre phase of the trial and possible a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal to the Idaho Supreme court.'
(Emphasis added). See Mortensen Affidavit,

fl 15 at R., Vol. 2, p. 317. Thereafter, on

March 26,2003, Mr. Mollerup sent Mortensen another letter wherein he ratified Stewart
Title's commitment to represent Mortensen on an appeal:
As you are aware, on March 1sth,2003, Judge Mitchell
denied Mr. Reagan's motion for a 54(b) certificate.
Therefore, as I am sure Mr. Reagan has told you, no appeal
can be filed until after the damage phase of the trial.
regard to vow request for a commitment from Stewart to
appeal Judge Mitchell's decision, I believe Stewart has
already given vou that commitment unless the case can be
settled earlier.
(Emphasis added). Id.
Not long after receiving the above referenced correspondence, Stewart Title
changed its position and refused to continue defending the Akers lawsuit and to pursue
the appeal of Judge Mitchell's decision. Mortensen was notified of Stewart Title's
change in position by way of correspondence dated May 14, 2004.

In this

correspondence, Mr. Mollerup stated - "Therefore, as a result of this payment, Stewart
Title will not prosecute an appeal of the iudgment to be entered in the above referenced
action, nor will it post a supersedeas bond to stay the execution of the judgment." See

Mortensen Affidavit, 16at R., Val. 2, p. 318.
As a result of this reversal of fortune, Mortensen has been forced to retain counsel
to assist him throughout the appeal and further proceedings in the lawsuit without any
assistance, financial or otherwise, from Stewart Title. The lawsuit has lasted over five
years, is still on going, and has cost Mortensen hundreds of thousands of dollars since
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Stewart Title refused to continue with the defense. See Mortensen Afidavit,

7 17 at R.,

Vol. 2, p. 318.
Mortensen relied to his great financial and emotional detriment on the
representations made by Stewart Title to protect his right of access to his property. See
Mortensen Afidavit,
IV.

118at R., Vol. 2, p. 319.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

A. Did the district court err by granting summary judgment on Mortensen's
claim for breach of the title insurance contract?
B. Did the district court err when applying the doctrine of Quasi-Estoppel to

the facts presented in this case?
C. Did the district court err in ruling the Mortensen's claim for emotional
distress was barred by the statute of limitations contained in Idaho Code 5
5-2 19?
D. Did the district court err when ruling on Mortensen's motion for
reconsideration that Mortensen "did not plead a breach of contract for
failure of Defendant to perform diligently"?

E. Did the district court err in awarding Stewart Title the sum of $25,000.00
in attorney fees under Idaho Code Cj 41-1 839(4)?
F. Whether Mortensen is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal.

V.

ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review on Appeal.

The standard of review on appeal from an order granting summary judgment is
the same standard as that used by the district court in ruling on the motion for summary

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

-7

judgment." Sorenson v. St. Alphonsus Reg? Med. Ctr., Inc., 141 Idaho 754,758 (2005).
Thus, the following standard of review applies to all issues on appeal:
The burden of proving the absence of a material fact rests at all
times upon the moving party. McCoy, 120 Idaho at 769, 820 P.2d at
364; Petricevich, 92 Idaho at 868, 452 P.2d at 365. This burden is
onerous because even "circumstantial" evidence can create a
genuine issue of material fact. McCoy, 120 Idaho at 769, 820 P.2d
at 364; Petricevich, 92 Idaho at 868,452 P.2d at 365.

Einrris v. State, Dept. of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 298, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159
(1992).
"[A111 doubts are to be resolved against the moving party."
Ashley v. Hubbard, 100 Idaho 67, 69, 593 P.2d 402, 404 (1979).
The motion must be denied "if the evidence is such that conflicting
inferences can be drawn therefrom and if reasonable [people] might
reach different conclusions." Id.

Doe v. Duvtschi, 716 P.2d 1238, 1242, 110 Idaho 466,470 (Idaho 1986).

...[T]he Court must liberally construe facts in the existing record in
favor of the nonmoving party, and draw all reasonable inferences
from the record in favor of the nonmoving party. Thompson, 126
Idaho at 529, 887 P.2d at 1036; Born v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539,
541,808 P.2d 876,878 (1991). Summary judgment is appropriate if
"the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765,769, 820 P.2d 360,
364 (1991). If there are conflicting inferences contained in the
record or reasonable minds might reach different conclusions,
summary judgment must be denied. Bonz, 119 Idaho at 541, 808
P.2d at 878.

State v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 129 Idaho 353,356, (Idaho 1996).924 P.2d. 615,618.
When applying the above standard to the facts of record, summary judgment
should never have been granted in this case.
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B.

The District Court Erred by Granting Summary Judgment on
Mortensen's Claim for Breach of the Title Insurance Contract.

The district court erred in ruling as a matter of law on the breach of contract
claim. Mortensen raised genuine issues of material fact touching on each element of the
claim for breach of contract - (1) the making of the contract, (2) an obligation assumed by
Stewart Title, and (3) the breach or failure to meet such obligation. Thomas v. Cute, 78
Idaho 29, 31, 296 P.2d 1033 (1956). A breach is defined as: "Failure without legal
excuse, to perform any promise which forms the whole or part of the contract

. . . .,,

Hughes v. Idaho State University, 122 Idaho 435, 437, 835 P.2d 670 (Ct. App. 1992).
Additionally, the concepts of "Good faith and fair dealing are implied obligations of
every contract." Luzar v. Western Sur. Co., 107 Idaho 693, 696, 692 P.2d 337 (1984).
These implied obligations are breached when action by either party violates, nullifies or
significantly impairs any benefit of a contract. Irwin Rogers Ins. Agency v. Murphy, 122
Idaho 270,274,833 P.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1992).
The analysis is straight forward. The parties acknowledged the making of a
contract of title insurance. Stewart Title conceded "Mortensen's policy insured access to
the property he was buying."

See Stewart Title's Memo In Support Of Summary

Judgment, p. 3 at R., Vol. 1, p. 126; see also the Holt Afl, Ex. 2 at R., Vol. 1, p. 103.
Thus, the only issue is whether a sufficient factual basis exists to support the proposition
that Stewart Title breached the contract of insurance. No doubt the record contains ample
facts to show breach. Chief among them is the fact that Stewart Title breached its
obligation of insuring Mortensen's right of access to his property. The Akers litigation is
proof positive of Stewart Title's failure to deliver on its promise of the right of access. In
fact, the Akers litigation involves the Akers' claims that Mortensen has trespassed on the
very access route Stewart Title insured Mortensen had the right to use by way of an
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easement. For this reason alone, the title company's motion for summary judgment on
the claim for breach of contract should have been denied by the district court.
Other factual incidents of breach exist as well. As Mortensen has pointed out,
Stewart Title recognized a problem in Mortensen's legal right to access the property it
insured him access to. However, rather than notify Mortensen, Stewart Title phoned the
Akers and notified the Akers about the problem. In doing so, Stewart Title prompted the
Akers to file suit against Mortensen for trespass. Interestingly, Mortensen had to learn
about Stewart Title's precipitation of the Akers suit by listening to the testimony of Mrs.
Akers. It was then and there where Mortensen first learned Stewart Title went behind his
back in an effort to cure the access issue. Stewart Title failed miserably in its effort to fix
the access problem by notifying the Akers of its existence. To be clear, Mortensen does
not argue that Stewart Title had no contractual right to take action in an effort to fix rights
insured under the policy. The policy plainly gives Stewart Title such a right:
The company shall have the right, at its own cost, to
institute and prosecute any action or proceeding or to do
any other act which in its opinion may be necessary or
desirable to establish the title to the estate or interest as
insured, or to prevent or reduce loss or damage to the
insured. The company may take any appropriate action
under the terms of the policy, whether or not it shall be
liable hereunder, and shall not thereby concede liability or
waive any provision of this policy. If the Company shall
exercise it rights under this paragraph, it shall do so
diligently.

See Holt Afidavit, Exhibit No. 2 at R., Vol. I , p. 108. However, according to the express
language in the policy, the company has to act diligently, and under the duty of good faith
and fair dealing, should not act in secret. If the title company had acted diligently and in
good faith, it would have first notified Mortensen about the access problem and
developed a plan for fixing the problem in cooperation with Mortensen. Instead, Stewart
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Title chose to hide the problem from Mortensen and go behind his back. Obviously a
jury could find in favor of Mortensen on the issue of breach of contract. Thus, for this
additional reason the motion for summary judgment on the contractually based claim
should have been denied.
Moreover, Stewart Title's next attempt at curing the access issue by procuring a
quitclaim deed to the triangular shaped parcel from Kathryn Baker failed horribly as well.
Here again, a jury could find Stewart Title breached its contractual obligations to act
diligently and in good faith. Stewart Title told Mortensen and White it had purchased the
small triangle parcel from Kathryn Baker and placed it in their names so they could use it
for access, and could make improvements on it; it was theirs. In doing so, Stewart Title
made a grave error. As it turned out, the recording and quit claiming of a deed from Ms.
Baker meant nothing; she never owned it; the Akers did. Nonetheless, Mortensen and
White built an access road across the small triangular parcel believing it was theirs and
previously Ms. Baker's as Stewart Title had assured them, when in reality it belonged to
the Akers. Mortensen and White were found to have trespassed on that small triangular
parcel because they relied on and believed in the expertise of Stewart Title.
Simply put, Stewart Title attempted to buy a property which it believed belonged
to Baker, but in truth belonged to the Akers. Stewart Title convinced Mortensen, with a
recorded deed from Baker that he owned the property and thus Mortensen used that
property for an access road and as a consequence was found by the court to be trespassing
on Akers property and the Akers were awarded damages for trespass, emotional distress,
and punitive damages.
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Stewart Title may have thought it gave Mortensen and White a triangular property
and might have thought that Baker was the owner, but Stewart Title was wrong on all
counts. The fact that it thought Baker owned the property while in fact the Akers owned
it does not change the fact that Mortensen was damaged by the title company's mistakes.
Had Stewart Title been diligent, acted fairly and in good faith and taken appropriate
action by studying the facts and law there would have been no mix up as to who owned
the triangular parcel and Mortensen would not have wound up in the damaging mess in
which he found himself.
Finally and perhaps most compellingly, a jury could find a breach to act in good
faith from the fact agents and counsel for Stewart Title in one letter after the next
promised to effect an appeal if that was necessary to fulfill its contractual obligation to
insure Mortensen's right to access his property. A jury could find the reneging of such an
obligation to be in breach of the policy.
It was error to grant summary judgment to Stewart Title on the claim for breach
of contract.

C.

The District Court Erred in its Application of the Doctrine of QuasiEstoppel to the Facts Presented Here.

The district court properly noted the doctrine of quasi-estoppel applies when: (1)
the offending party took a different position than his or her original position and (2)
either (a) the offending party gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other
party; (b) the other party was induced to change positions; or (c) it would be
unconscionable to permit the offending party to maintain an inconsistent position from
one he or she has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in. R., Vol. 2, p. 426; see
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Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 138 P.3d 310 (2006). However when applying the
doctrine of quasi-estoppel, the district court erred by stating as follows:
Plaintiff can establish a genuine material issue that
Defendant took a different position from its original action
(i.e., defending first and later indemnifying), but there is no
evidence to establish that this was an unconscionable
change in position given that those options were expressly
provided for in the insurance contract.

Id. (emphasis added).
First, based upon the record, Stewart Title has not shown it delivered the policy to
Mortensen. In fact, Mortensen testified he did not recall receiving a copy (Mortensen
Afidavit, p. 2, 13 at R., Vol. 2, p. 314), and Stewart Title has not presented any facts to
the contrary. Of course, the issue of whether the policy was delivered to Mortensen
speaks directly to whether Stewart Title's change of position was unconscionable. If
Stewart Title never provided Mortensen the policy, then its act of relying on the policy to
justify such a drastic change of position clearly amounts to unconscionability.
However, even when assuming for the sake of argument that Stewart Title
delivered the policy to Mortensen, a genuine issue of fact still remains as to whether
Stewart Title acted unconscionably. The record plainly demonstrates that Stewart Title
sent a series of letters, promising over and over again, to pursue the Akers litigation on
appeal on behalf of Mortensen. The March 26,2003, correspondence from Mr. Mollerup
punctuates the unequivocal nature of Stewart Title's promise to pursue the appeal:
With regard to your request for a commitment from Stewart
to appeal Judge Mitchell's decision, I believe Stewart has
already given you that commitment unless the case can be
settled earlier.
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R., Vol. 2, p. 317; (emphasis added). None of the language in the March 26, 2003,
correspondence even hints about how Stewart Title may switch its position by falling
back on policy language which arguably allowed it to release itself of the appeal by
tendering limits under the policy. None of the earlier letters sent by Stewart Title
mention anything about it either. If perhaps Stewart Title notified Mortensen in the series
of letters that it was reserving the right to tender policy limits in lieu of the appeal, then
summary judgment on the issue of unconscionability may have been in order. However,
since Stewart Title did not do this, a genuine issue of material fact precludes summary
adjudication of this issue as well.
In further illustration of the unconscionability, it may be worth noting that
Mortensen bought the property in question in 1994. The issues in the Akers litigation did
not develop until several years later in 2001. Again, therefore, even if Stewart Title had
delivered the policy to Mortensen in the 1994 time frame, to avoid an unconscionable
change in position, it clearly would have behooved Stewart Title to deliver anolher copy
when the Akers dispute arose in 2001 or, at a minimum, to cite to the language in the
policy when sending the multitude of letters to Mortensen guaranteeing him protection on
appeal. Whether or not the policy was delivered, Mortensen has shown a genuine issue
of fact on each element of the doctrine of quasi-estoppel.
Moreover, a jury could find Stewart Title promised on numerous occasions that it
would protect Mortensen on appeal based upon its realization that it created the mess of
litigation in which Mortensen found himself. A jury could find that after learning just
how big a mess Stewart Title created for Mortensen, it then decided to renege on its
promise to handle the appeal. A jury could find Stewart Title waived its right to come
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out from underneath the appeal by sending letters to Mortensen without expressly
notifying Mortensen it may rely on the right to withdraw and by reserving the right to go
in the diametrically opposite direction. The case of Boise Motor Car Company v. St.

Paul Mercury Indemnity Company, 62 Idaho 438,448 (1941) demonstrates the point:
Where the insured refuses to enter into an agreement permitting the
insurer to defend with reservations, and communicates to the insurer a
denial of the latter's right to so defend with reservation . . . and thereafter
the insurer fails to withdraw and continues to represent the insured in
defense of the suit, the law is clear that the insurer has waived its right to
withdraw, and will be estooped to later assert such a right when sued by
the insured for failure to prooerlv defend. (Emphasis added).
That is exactly what happened here. A jury could find it unconscionable for
Stewart Title to fall back on a right it had previously waived. Accordingly, summary
judgment on this theory should not have been entered against Mortensen.

D.

The District Court Erred In Ruling the Claim for Emotional Distress
was Time Barred by the Statute of Limitations Contained in Idaho
Code 5-219.

As Stewart Title acknowledged, the claim for infliction of emotional distress
arguably involves a continuing tort. See Memo, pp. 8-9, at R., Vol. 2, pp. 302-303 (citing

Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 604, 850 P.2d 749, 755 (1993)). Based upon the facts
presented here, it would be reasonable for a jury to find the infliction of emotional
distress will, at a minimum, continue until Stewart Title either recommences its efforts to
fix the problem in Mortensen's right of access or the underlying Akers' suit reaches its
final destination. Due to the continuing nature of the tort involved here, the statute of
limitations did not bar Mortensen's pursuit of recovery for emotional distress.
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E.

The District Court Erred when Ruling Mortensen did not Plead a
Breach of Contract for Failure of Stewart Title to Perform Diligently.

This may he the plainest of all errors committed by the district court. In count
three of the Complaint, Mortensen included a cause of action for breach of contract. R.,
Vol. 1, p. 6. Yet, on the motion for reconsideration, the district court ruled:
Plaintiff urges this Court to reconsider summary judgment
for Defendant on Plaintiffs Breach of Contract Claim.
Plaintiff argued that a term of the contract in question,
under paragraph 4(h) was for defendant, if it exercised its
right to take steps to establish title in real property for
Plaintiff, to act diligently.
Plaintiff is accurate in describing this particular term of the
contract; however Plaintiff did not plead a breach of
contract for failure of Defendant to perform diligently.
Plaintiffs only breach of contract claim alleges that
Defendant failed to defend Plaintiff by prosecuting an
appeal of the court's judgment in Akers v. Mortensen,
Kootenai Co. Civil Case No. 020222.
The Complaint filed by Mortensen adequately placed Stewart Title on notice of
Mortensen's claim for breach of contract.

The factual allegations contained in

paragraphs three (3) through thirty-one (3 1) specifically describe the lack of diligence on
the part of Stewart Title. R., Vol. 1, pp. 2-5. In modern pleading, the "purpose of a
complaint is to inform the defendant of the material facts upon which the plaintiff rests
the action." Quinto v. Millwood Forest Products, 130 Idaho 162, 167 (Ct. App. 1997).
The Mortensen Complaint more than satisfies the rules and practice of modem pleading.
It was clear error to find otherwise.
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F.

The District Court Erred by Awarding Attorney Fees to Stewart Title.

The district court erred by finding Mortensen brought suit unreasonably and
without foundation and awarding Stewart Title $25,000.00 in attorney fees. R., Vol. 3,
pp. 604-605. Mortensen's complaint against Stewart Title was solidly anchored in fact
and well grounded in existing Idaho law. The fact the Court ruled unfavorably to
Mortensen does not, in and of itself, render the complaint frivolous. Nonetheless,
Stewart Title argues the case was frivolous because some of the claims were barred by
the statute of limitations. However, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense
and is waived unless asserted and therefore does not make a claim for relief frivolous
when, like here, the prima facia elements of the claim are supported by facts. Moreover,
Mortensen presented good faith arguments that the applicable statute of limitations in this
case had not yet run due to the continuing nature of Stewart Title's wrongful conduct. A
non-persuasive argument is not synonymous with a frivolous argument. The award of
attorney fees should be reversed and set aside.
G.

Attorney Fees on Appeal

Mortensen claims the right to recover attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho
Code 9 41-1839, I.A.R. 41, and I.A.R. 35(a)(5).

CONCLUSION
Mortensen respectfully seeks a reversal of the district court's order granting
summary judgment in favor of Stewart Title.
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I CERTIFY that on the
day of May, 2009, I caused a true and correct
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Todd Reuter, Esq.
Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Preston Gates Ellis , L.L.P.
618 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 300
Spokane, WA 99201-0602
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to: (509) 444-7872

JOHNSON &MONTELEONE, L.L.P.

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

-

19

